Secularization as historical struggle

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Debating the term secularization

At the latest with the rise of Islamist terrorist groups, religion has again become one of the most-debated topics in Western public discourse. This was not always the case. For a long time, it was supposed that religion would decline and eventually vanish completely in the course of modernization. This assumption is known as secularization, and it may well be one of the oldest master narratives in the humanities. Having existed in sociology since the very beginning in Comte’s law of the three stages, albeit under different names and versions, the concept can be found in the works of almost all of the founding fathers of the discipline. Hans Joas even goes so far as to critically understand the paradigm of »modernity without religion« as one of the founding myths of sociology (Joas 2012, 605–6).

However, secularization theory has recently been put on the defensive. As again Joas puts it, even those who still support the hypothesis of a causal relationship between modernity and secularization have to admit that they are the minority (Joas 2012, 606–7). The critiques are manifold. Indeed, doubt about the concept was already voiced in the 1960s, and in the ensuing debate an immense variety of theories was developed instead. Even some explicit theories of de-secularization have emerged (e.g., Berger 1999). One might follow Gorski (2000) in distinguishing an »old paradigm« of secularization from a »new paradigm« of religious vitality. As a result, there is such a confusing multitude of meanings of the terms secularization and secularity that it is hardly possible to get an overview. The three very different approaches to systematizing the use of the term by José Casanova (1994), Karel Dobbelaaere (2004), and Friedrich Fürstenberg (1994) may
give an impression of the huge and diverse body of scholarship produced under the banner of secularization.

The stances taken against and in favor of the secularization theorem are legion. Two things are remarkable about the debate. First, it often seems as if empirical observations are passed off as theory (e.g., this seems to be the case in Berger 1999). Second, the debate is often polarized. As Fox (2008, 30) rightly notes, »the past prominence of modernization-secularization theory can easily place any discussion of the changing role of religion in modern times into a simplistic format where secularization is occurring or it is not. Yet, there seems to be a growing realization that this dichotomy does not reflect reality.«

Several scholars have proposed studying secularization from a conflict-centered perspective in recent years as a way to overcome the secularization/sacralization dichotomy. Smith (2003) proposes examining secularization from the perspective of social movement theory. Karstein et al. (2006) and Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux (2009) study the relationship between the state and religion in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) from the perspective of a struggle over ideology. For Borutta (2010, 347), »secularization was a product of the European Culture Wars.« Stolz (2013) proposes a »theory of religious-secular competition.« Quack (2013) suggests constructing a religion-related field in order to grasp the competition between religious and non-religious actors. And Fox (2015)

1 To cite only a few examples: Berger 1999; Bruce 2011; Casanova 1994, 2006, 2009; P. Jenkins 2002; Pollack 2013, 2003; Riesebrodt 2001; Stark 1999; Thomas 2007.

2 Maybe this polarization of the debate corresponds with the phenomenon that religion itself is fundamentally ambivalent (cf. Appleby 2000; cf. Schäfer 2004). This ambivalence is also reflected outside academia and even outside of the religious field, for instance in the 1983 German punk rock song »Religion« by Slime and its 2004 cover by Jesus Skins, with Slime stating that »religion means oppression, religion is opium for the people, religion has killed millions of people« [trans. SMS] and Jesus Skins asserting that »religion is no oppression, religion is like free beer for the people, religion has saved millions of people« [trans. SMS].

164
takes a competition perspective on the relation between politics and religion in the context of an impressive *World Survey of Religion and the State* (Fox 2008).

Each of these approaches focuses on different »aspects of religion« (Fox 2008, 2). While Karstein et al. (2006), Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux (2009), and Fox (2008, 2015) take a close look at the relation between the state and religion, Smith (2003) and Borutta (2010) mainly take a historical perspective on conflicts between intellectuals and religious actors for public influence. Stolz (2013) focuses on the individual demand for religious goods, which is challenged by non-religious suppliers, and Quack (2013) tries to grasp, among other things, the relation between actively atheist groups and religious convictions.

If a conflict-centered approach can fruitfully be applied to such a diverse range of aspects, then it seems likely that a more comprehensive approach to secularization based on the conflict perspective can be of some use in order to understand the complex phenomenon of religious change with its different aspects and regional specificities. In the first section, I will present such an approach quite briefly (cf. for the detailed development of the approach Schlerka 2016). Then, I will show that the approach itself is not complete until it is historicized. Finally, I will look back, draw some conclusions, and point to perspectives for further research and possible theoretical byproducts of empirical studies based on the approach presented here.

**Conceptualizing secularization as struggle**

Bourdieu’s praxeology is a suitable option as the theoretical basis of a general approach on secularization from the conflict perspective for three reasons. First, it has a keen eye on social conflict, most notably in the field concept (cf. particularly Bourdieu 1988, 1995, 1996; for religion particularly Bourdieu 1987, 1991, 2011). Second, in light of studies revealing

3 This, however, does not mean that they practice what Smith (2003, 14) criticized as »an orientation (primarily among historians) of idealist intellectual history.«
that the religious landscape in the Global South is not only flourishing more than in the West (Norris and Inglehart 2004), but even expanding (P. Jenkins 2002), general social inequality seems to play a major role for secularization. Accordingly, praxeology not only accounts for power struggles in eigenlawful fields, but—by means of the space model—also for social inequality in society as a whole (cf. particularly Bourdieu 2010, 1998). Finally, praxeology can be operationalized well for empirical research. This is evidenced by numerous research works based on a praxeological approach (a small selection of studies focusing on religion: Bremer, Vester, and Vögele 2002; Fer 2010; Kaden 2015; Karstein et al. 2006; Karstein 2013; Köhnsen 2016; Maduro 2005; Reddig 2012; Reuter 2014; Rey 1999; Seibert 2018; Schäfer 2015b; Suárez 2015).

An interesting starting point in praxeology is Bourdieu’s little-known text about »the dissolution of the religious.« In this text, Bourdieu describes—in some aspects quite similarly to Luckmann (1967)—the dissolution of institutionalized religion which takes place through a blurring of the borders of the religious field. According to him, »nowadays there is an imperceptible transition from the old school clergymen [... to] cult members, psychoanalysts, psychologists, physicians (experts in psychosomatics, alternative practitioners), sexologists, teachers of diverse forms of bodily expression and of Asian martial arts, life counselors, social workers« (Bourdieu 2011, 245; trans. SMS). This, in turn, is the result of »struggles for the enforcement of a legitimate definition of both the religious and the different ways of fulfilling the religious role« (Bourdieu 2011, 243; trans. SMS).

Based on this short text, Astrid Reuter (2014) conducted a detailed study on legal conflicts over religion in Germany that interprets such legal

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4 The term »eigenlawfulness« as a translation of Weber’s Eigengesetzlichkeit was proposed by Seibert (2018, 135n150).

5 Originally, the text was a conference talk given in 1982. The French original was first published as »Le champ religieux dans le champ de production symboliques« in 1985 (Bourdieu 1985). To the best of my knowledge, there is no English translation. Thus, in the present article I refer to the German translation (Bourdieu 2011).
conflicts and public controversies as struggles about the boundaries of the religious field. In a theoretical conclusion (Reuter 2014, 284–93), she rightly states that not only religious actors are involved in struggles about the boundaries of the religious field, but actors from a diverse range of fields, e.g., the fields of politics, science, and law. Furthermore, she states that those actors not only stem from different fields, but also from «different social levels: as representatives of state order and civil society dynamics, as private individuals or as representatives of religious communities or political coalitions of interests, as pupils or teachers, as scientists or as journalistic observers and reporters, as judges, lawyers, etc.» (Reuter 2014, 286; trans. SMS). She criticizes that the two-dimensional field model as proposed by Bourdieu is not suitable for portraying field-external actors and the different social levels. In consequence, she proposes developing the field model into a three-dimensional religious space, similar to Bourdieu’s social space.

However, Reuter stays quite vague at this point and does not give concrete advice for empirically modeling such a religious space, which is why it is difficult to assess her proposal. While it is certainly true that the field model as such cannot represent either the actors external to the field or the different »social levels,« this is not even necessary. The scope of the field model is to give an account of the state of power relations between actors involved in eigenlawful »games« at a given moment in time. Its purpose is not to model each and every aspect of the social, nor—as a synchronous model—is its purpose to model the struggle dynamics between the actors (cf. Schäfer 2018; forthcoming). Both aspects are better captured by qualitative work focusing on the concrete dynamics of the struggle between religious and non-religious actors. This is what Reuter herself does in the quoted study. Furthermore, including the actors external to the field in the model would probably run into the very same problem that Wohlrab-Sahr and Kaden (2013, 200–201) criticize in Karstein et al. (2006) and Quack (2013). This problem lies in the difficulty of identifying an illusio and nomos that is common to all actors in this field and at the same time distinct from the ones of their respective »home
fields.« In consequence, it seems more reasonable to me to stay with the two-dimensional religious field.

In field-theoretical terms, what Bourdieu means in his above-quoted text when referring to »the legitimate definition of both the religious and the different ways of fulfilling the religious role« (Bourdieu 2011, 243; trans. SMS) is most probably the nomos concept. However, this term does not appear in Bourdieu’s own take on the religious field as developed in two articles from 1971 (Bourdieu 1991, 1987; original: Bourdieu 1971a, 1971b). These two articles represent a rather early stage of the field concept, its »first rigorous formulation,« after which »the theory of fields […] was thus gradually elaborated« (Bourdieu 1995, 182). The most sophisticated and complete formulation of the field concept can be found in The Rules of Art (Bourdieu 1995), where Bourdieu writes about the French literary field in the nineteenth century. Here, the nomos plays an important role. It is defined as »the fundamental law of the field, the principle of vision and division (nomos) defining the artistic field (etc.) as such, meaning as the site of art as art« (Bourdieu 1995, 223).

Building on this version of the field concept, Leif Seibert (2010, 2018) developed a reconceptualization of the religious field. In line with Bourdieu’s advice to »avoid the positivist mistake of pre-definition« (Bourdieu 2011, 244; trans. SMS), Seibert refrains from giving a final definition of religion in order to develop a working concept as a tool »to decide what to look for and what to ignore« that is at the same time »open for revisions on the grounds of the empirical data« (Seibert 2018, 38). Besides three other aspects, he derives from Juergensmeyer (2003) »the reference of transcendent causality« as a »criterion that allows to distinguish religious and irreligious practice« (Seibert 2018, 39–40).  

6 The other three aspects in contrast serve to further understanding: »systematicity, reflexivity, and esteem are criteria that foster sociological understanding of the believer’s accounts; the consideration of the aesthetical fit of interpretations and experiences aims for conclusions on the guiding principles of these accounts; and the potential for contingency management allows for a functional explanation« (Seibert 2018, 40).
As I already mentioned above, a field is a model for the analysis of eigenlawful conflicts. This immediately leads to two questions: Who is struggling, and what are they struggling about? In order to answer both questions, it is important to distinguish between specialists or performers and laypeople. Seibert (2018, 218) notes in this regard that »the combatants—or players—of the field are the religious performers, i.e., functionaries and specialists in control of the means of religious production,« while »the religious audience is excluded from the actual game.« However, even without directly participating the laypeople still play an important role, since their belief is the object of the struggle. Thus, religious capital in Seibert (2018, 221–34) is conceived as a sort of social capital that is composed of two aspects, »complexity« and »credibility.« Both of these aspects can be constructed as statistical variables from survey data. The former refers to the »logarithmic proportion between performers and audience« (Seibert 2018, 224). The latter refers to »religious authenticity« (Seibert 2018, 227), that is, closeness to the actual semantic content of the religious nomos.

The »question for the actual content of the religious nomos is synonymous with the question for ›true‹ religion« (Seibert 2018, 228). In empirical work, this content can be assessed by qualitative analysis. Since the field is actually a battlefield, its nomos—and thus the very definition of what is at stake—is always the object of struggles. Thus, »the demarcations between legitimate religion and illegitimate superstition« (Seibert 2018, 228) are by no means static in a given society, but always subject to change, depending on the struggles fought around these demarcations. In other words, what we arrive at here is exactly what Bourdieu stated in the text on the »dissolution of the religious« discussed above. In contrast to Bourdieu’s short text as well as other studies that are based on it, however, the foundation in Seibert provides not only a consistent theoretical framework that goes beyond a merely metaphorical use of the concepts, but also a good deal of operationalizability for empirical work.

However, religious specialists are not the only ones interested in the definition of religion. Put in Bourdieusian terms, »the illusio, i.e. the belief in the relevance of the religious game […] applies to both participants of
the game and non-participants—though, of course, not in the same way« (Seibert 2018, 386). And if laypeople—who can be specialists in any field other than the religious—deem religion relevant, then they will likely also develop their own ideas of what legitimate religion looks like. Notably, those ideas might differ from those held by religious specialists. Having an idea about what religion looks like also implies having an idea of what religion does not look like, which means that we are dealing with the boundaries between religion and non-religion. In other words, what we arrive at here is precisely what Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012) refer to with their conception of secularity.

Following these considerations I define secularism as normative ideas that non-religious actors have about what legitimate religious praxis ought to look like.8 Furthermore, they try to impose those secularist ideas on the religious actors (cf. Schlerka 2016, 124). It is important to note that at this point, I go beyond the first formulation of the approach, in which I used this definition to define the term «secularity.» However, for reasons of conceptual clarity and in reference to Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), «secularism» seems to fit better. This shift in terms opens the space for defining secularity in a way that is closer to both Bourdieu’s relational epistemology and, at the same time, the «multiple secularities» approach (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012; Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr, and Middell 2015; Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2017), namely as the actual power-laden relation between secularist and religious actors, if and insofar as the religious actors in question have adapted their praxis to

7 It is important to keep in mind that the term »religious actor« refers to specialists. Thus, the term »non-religious actor« does not mean that the respective actor would not hold any religious beliefs—it merely means that they are not professionals participating in any kind of religious production.

8 For reasons of academic honesty, it has to be mentioned that this is a modified version of Luhmann’s concept of secularization, according to which the question of religion and secularity depends on the observer. Secularization, according to Luhmann, is the mode in which religious observers perceive their non-religious environment under conditions of functional differentiation (cf. Luhmann 1977, 225–71).
secularist ideas. Secularization, then, can be defined as the (voluntary or forced) adaptation of a single actor’s religious praxis to secularism (cf. Schlerka 2016, 124).

Empirical examples of such struggles about the definition of legitimate religious praxis can be found in Manuel Borutta (2010) and Astrid Reuter (2014). Writing about the cultural struggles (Kulturkämpfe) between liberals and the Roman Catholic church in Germany and Switzerland during the nineteenth century, Borutta (2010, 376; trans. SMS) concludes that most liberals »stood up for a particular understanding of religion that assigned it a specific place and a defined meaning. They declared religion to be a private matter and demanded a separation of politics and religion into autonomous spheres in which reason and knowledge or belief should be dominant.« Similarly, Reuter (2014)—with explicit reference to Bourdieu’s above-quoted text »the dissolution of the religious«—interprets legal conflicts about religion in Germany (namely about crucifixes, female teachers wearing the Muslim headscarf, and denominational religious education in public schools) as »definitional political disputes about what religion is and what its societal role is« that were fought by »actors from different societal fields« (Reuter 2014, 271; trans. SMS).

If secularization is about the legitimate meaning of religion, then this meaning as well as the ideas of the actors can be assessed for different aspects of religious praxis. Probably the most relevant aspects for secularization are the three meanings of the term identified by Casanova (1994), namely differentiation, privatization, and religious decline. I understand these three terms as different dimensions of secularization. In all three dimensions, what is considered as legitimately religious and what is not depends on the religious nomos. As a result, secularisms as well as religious praxis may be analyzed according to the dimensions in which they make claims. From a discussion of several approaches, each of which focuses mainly on one of these dimensions,9 I drew the conclusion that each of

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these three terms has to be differentiated further. More specifically, it is possible to distinguish two aspects of each dimension (Schlerka 2016, 81–127).

First, differentiation has to be differentiated further. Its first aspect is the autonomy of the religious field. This aspect refers to the degree of freedom from non-religious influences, for example, secularist politics that try to regulate religious praxis by means of law. A good example of the effects of secularism targeting autonomy is the largest German mosque association, DİTİB (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği). Founded in 1985, it stands in a complex relationship of dependency to the Turkish state’s Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), which was founded in 1924 as a means of establishing state control over religion (cf. for DİTİB and its relationship to Diyanet Gorzewski 2015; cf. for Diyanet Zürcher 2017, 188–196; Fox 2008, 246–247) that is difficult to assess. As Theresa Beilschmidt (2015, 180–183) has shown, this entanglement with the state corroborates DİTİB’s credibility in the eyes of the laity of Turkish origin in Germany. In relation to the German state, however, it is rather problematic, since the German state requires religious organizations to have a high degree of autonomy and independence from state influence if it is to support them. The consequences for DİTİB can be seen, for instance, in the issue of religious education in public schools. Since in Germany, according to the Basic Law, the state cannot set a curriculum for religious education, it is argued that allowing DİTİB to do so could possibly mean granting the Turkish state rights in Germany that the German state itself does not possess (cf. Gorzewski 2015, 51–53 and 181–183). Other examples include the concepts of »government involvement in religion« and »separation of religion and state« used by Fox (2008), as well as the »dilemma of the right to religious freedom« described by Reuter (2014, 88–99).

The other aspect of differentiation comprises the expansivity of religious sociodicies. I conceptualize the term »sociodicy« more broadly than
Bourdieu himself\(^\text{10}\) as a normative principle of capital distribution that may work either as a legitimatizing myth or as a promise of social ascent (cf. Schlerka 2016, 97–105). Examples of sociodicies could be »billionaires are what they are because of their hard work« »good education leads to professional success« or, in a religious context, the Calvinist predestination doctrine described by Weber ([1920] 2001). Sociodicies may be analyzed according to the three criteria of (1) the *agency* they grant the individual to ascend, (2) their *inclusivity*, that is the premises they postulate for social ascent, and (3) their *expansivity* toward other capital sorts, that is, whether they are prone to be transferred to other fields by means of homology or metaphor (Schlerka 2016, 103–4). In the context of the secularization debate, perhaps the most striking issue in this regard is militant fundamentalism, which, according to Fox (2008, 24), »can be traced to this desire to reform the world in their religion’s image.« This means nothing else than expansivity of a religious sociodicy toward all other capital sorts. Since in other fields an expansive sociodicy is a heterodox claim to power, this operation very likely leads to further conflict.

The privatization dimension can be disaggregated in a similar way. Here, the first aspect would be the individualization of contents of faith. This refers to what Luckmann (1967, 99) suggested when he wrote that »the individual may choose from the assortment of ultimate meanings as he sees fit.« At the other end of this spectrum, there are the church or church-like organizations that prescribe a set dogma. The tension between the two poles is shown by Hubert Knoblauch (2003), for instance, who gives an example of this when writing that, since churches in Europe often are powerful enough to define what is considered religion and what is not, »alternative forms of religion« are often »classified under the label of New Age« (Knoblauch 2003, 271).

The other aspect of privatization is the private/public distinction, which Casanova (1994) referred to with his term »public religion.« Besides Casanova himself, there are plenty of empirical examples of this aspect.

\(^{10}\) To him, a sociodicy is a »justification of society, of the established order« (Bourdieu 2000, 71n18).
Consider for example the quotation from Borutta (2010, 376) given above, stating that in the *Kulturkämpfe* most liberals strove to restrict religion to the private sphere. Or Reuter (2014), who interprets the legal conflicts that she analyzed in terms of which role religion should play in the public sphere. A further example can be found in Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux (2009, 299–301) where they emphasize that in the GDR the boundary between the private and public sphere also marked the boundary between what could and could not be spoken about.

Finally, for religious decline it is important to note that I conceptualize the performance of religious praxis as solving laypeople’s problems. The definition of *what* those problems may be and *which* solutions are available for them depends empirically on the semantic content of the religious *nomos*. Thus, it is intentional that the two terms are not defined more closely. What is important for the secularization issue, however, is the fact that problems, whatever they may consist of, are neither historically invariant nor do religious actors enjoy a monopoly on offering solutions. Rather, laypeople’s problems may change, and there may be other, non-religious specialists (e.g., philosophers, psychologists, the welfare state) that offer solutions to the same problems. Thus, when looking at religious decline there are two aspects: first, changing problems and second, competition by non-religious actors. Those two aspects are well-established in the sociology of religion. Besides Stolz (2013), who focuses on the aspect of competition between religious and non-religious actors, there are many more examples for both aspects. First, from an explicitly conflict-centered perspective, Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux (2009) emphasize

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11 Here, I am again very close to Luhmann, for whom the performance of religion is to claim »responsibilities for ›residual problems‹ or personal burdens and fates […] that are produced but not dealt with in other functional systems« (Luhmann 1977, 58; trans. SMS); original: »Zuständigkeiten für ›Restprobleme‹ oder Personbelastungen und Schicksale […], die in anderen Funktionssystemen erzeugt, aber nicht behandelt werden.« (ibid.)
the role of the Jugendweihe\textsuperscript{12} in the conflict between the churches and the socialist state in the GDR. Another interesting example of both aspects is given by Andrew Abbott (1980), who describes for America in the period 1875–1935, first, a shift in the interpretation of everyday problems in the direction of psychiatry and, second, the competition between psychiatrists and pastoral counseling. Still another example can be found in Schäfer (2015b), who analyzes the role that Pentecostalism played as well as the problems and solutions offered by religious praxis for different social strata in the Guatemalan civil war.

To summarize briefly, all three dimensions of secularization mentioned by Casanova (1994)—differentiation, privatization, religious decline—are covered by the secularization as struggle approach. Further, each of them can be disaggregated into two aspects. Differentiation may either indicate the religious actors’ freedom from field-external compromise, their autonomy, or it may indicate the confinement of religious sociodicies to the religious field. Privatization can mean an individual compilation of contents of faith, or it can denote a limitation of religious praxis to the private sphere. Religious decline finally may be due to laypeople’s changing problems or it may be caused by competition between religious and non-religious actors. For all of the aspects mentioned, what is considered legitimate and what is not depends on the actual semantic content of the religious nomos, which is always an object of struggle.

Since the direction these struggles take depends on the actual power of the actors involved, it is difficult to make predictions about their outcomes. It is, however, possible to pose hypotheses. First, social structure is one of the key elements giving the struggles their context. As both Norris and Inglehart (2004) and P. Jenkins (2002) conclude from their empirical findings, religion »is flourishing wonderfully among the poor and persecuted, while it atrophies among the rich and secure« (P. Jenkins 2002, 220). Thus, it seems reasonable to pose the hypothesis that secularist

\textsuperscript{12} The Jugendweihe was a non-religious rite de passage for young people, which in the GDR was offered by the socialist state as an alternative to Christian confirmation.
actors enjoy better opportunities in wealthy societies. Second, with a view to America as described by Smith (2003) and Germany as described by Borutta (2010), it seems that a coalition of intellectuals and mass media can act as powerful secularist actors. This is hardly surprising, since those two sectors today play the main role in maintaining and transmitting cultural values. Third, the role of the state is somewhat ambivalent. While a glance at the example of the GDR (cf. Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux 2009; Karstein et al. 2006; Karstein 2013) might suggest that the state can be an extremely powerful secularist actor, things become more complicated on closer inspection. In terms of theory, in Bourdieu it is not clear whether the state may count as an actor at all. In contrast, in his lectures On the State (Bourdieu 2014) he speaks of the state as a »principle of orthodoxy,« as »that which founds the logical conformity and moral conformity of the social world, and in this way, the fundamental consensus on the meaning of the social world that is the very precondition of conflict over the social world« (Bourdieu 2014, 4). Seen like this, the state could rather be understood as a powerful tool that secularist actors may use.

In the preceding paragraphs, I outlined a conflict-centered approach on secularization phenomena based on praxeological field theory. From a discussion of Bourdieu’s text on the »dissolution of the religious« (Bourdieu 2011), I took as a starting point the idea that secularization is a matter of the legitimate meaning of being religious, or in field-theoretical terms: of the religious field’s nomos. Then, I outlined Seibert’s (2018) reformulation of the religious field based on Bourdieu’s most elaborated take on the field in The Rules of Art (Bourdieu 1995), which serves as the basis for the »secularization as struggle« approach. According to this approach, the three dimensions of the term secularization as formulated by Casanova (1994)—differentiation, privatization, and religious decline—are seen as aspects of religious praxis. Thus, they all depend on the legitimate meaning of religion, the religious field’s nomos, which is always the object of struggle not only between religious specialists, but also between religious and non-religious actors. Seen like this, secularization can be conceptualized as the adaptation of a religious actor’s praxis to
the normative ideas that non-religious actors have about the legitimate meaning of religion. This conceptualization implies that what not only religion but also secularity actually mean is not fixed once and for all but an object of struggle. This is very much in line with the »multiple secula-
rities« approach formulated by Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), who claim that the meaning of secularity varies between different societies. In contrast to the latter approach, however, »secularization as struggle« makes use of the term secularization. In other words, it refers to a process without specifying its actual content. This, in turn, means that the approach must be taken on a diachronic level.

Combining sociological theory with historical research

In the previous section, I focused on sociological theory and exemplified the »secularization as struggle« approach by reference to empirical research. However, sociology alone cannot provide a sufficiently good account of phenomena of secularization. Rather, it has to be supplemented with a historical perspective. Originally, I treated the issue of history only marginally in the context of religious decline because of laypeople’s problems changing over time (cf. Schlerka 2016, 112–13). However, a closer look at the approach reveals that the historical aspects reach deeper. There are at least three reasons for a historicization of the approach presented.

The first reason to adopt a historical perspective is that often an illusionary past is used in a kind of straw man argument. One critique of such tendencies in secularization theory can be found in Smith (2003, 17–19), who names the »strong tendency to romanticize a religious past as a ›golden era‹ from which modern religious and nonreligious actors have fallen« (Smith 2003, 17) as one shortcoming of traditional secularization theory. As Gorski (2000, 143) shows, another version of this, claiming a less religious past, can be found in rational choice-influenced research postulating increasing religiosity in modernity. However, as Gorski argues, historical reality is more complex and shows ambivalent trends in different aspects of religion. In order to detect these different facets, he pleads for a historicization of the research on secularization. In a similar
vein, Pollack (2010) criticizes that both advocates and adversaries of the secularization hypothesis tend to construct an image of history in favor of their »side« in the secularization debate. Thus, in order to advance research on secularization, he also demands historicization.

Second, there is the conflict-centered perspective that strongly calls for historicization. The field model, as Seibert (2018, 251–53) rightly states, can only account for the synchronous configuration of power relations between actors. While this does not mean that the aspect of time is irrelevant in the model—rather, credibility as the potential for further mobilization points toward the future, complexity as the result of accomplished mobilization to the past, and the actor’s positions to the present state of affairs—a truly diachronic perspective could only be gained via longitudinal studies, i.e. a succession of different field models (Seibert 2018, 251). However, »it is in the very struggle that the history of the field is made; it is through struggles that it is temporalized« (Bourdieu 1995, 157). Since Bourdieu’s work is often received as rather static, further theoretical work is necessary.

The third reason is a little more complex. It is a result of the definitions of secularism, secularity, and secularization I gave above. In order to avoid historical teleology and to open the space for a dynamic, conflict-centered perspective on secularity and secularization, I defined each of the terms formally. The actual semantic content of the religious field’s nomos, of secularist ideas, and of the adaptation processes that do or do not happen between the two is not inscribed in the terms themselves and thus has to be determined empirically. For example, from the theoretical terms alone it is intentionally impossible to tell whether complete autonomy of religious actors or state control over religion is »more secular.« This is also true of the other dimensions: the meaning of which concrete praxis counts as secular and which one does not is not covered by the theoretical approach itself, but must be determined empirically. This enables one to take not only privatization and religious decline as options, but also even differentiation itself. Thus, this approach avoids conceptualizing differentiation in the way that Hans Joas (2012), echoing David Martin, criticized as being a »dangerous noun of process.« This need to fill the
formal terms with empirical content, however, has some consequences at the theoretical level.

In order to go into these consequences, it makes sense to begin by examining the relations between the terms. This can be done in one sentence: *Secularity* is the result of secularization, and *secularization* is the adaptation of religious praxis to *secularism*. What becomes visible here is that each of the three terms derives its meaning from its relation to other terms. Following this perspective, one may ask about the consequences of removing terms from the formula. (1) Analyzing *secularity without secularization* would risk running into a problem: even if a perfect fit between secularism and religious praxis were the result of such an analysis, it still would remain unclear whether religious praxis adapted to secularism or vice versa (a possibility that always has to be taken into account as well). Thus, it would remain unclear what makes this secularity specifically secular. (2) Studying *secularization without secularity*, in contrast, would be possible—although this would require a rather strange research design taking account of transformation processes while ignoring their results. (3) Research on *secularization without secularism* would blindly run into a severe problem: it would be unclear by what virtue this alleged secularization is secular. The reason is that the term secularization is defined as a process of adaptation toward secularism. Thus (4) *secularism without the other two terms*, finally, can be studied well, for example by means of discourse analysis. However, it is doubtful whether such an endeavor would be reasonable, since in this case the question of secularism’s societal effectiveness would have to be left aside.

The following conclusions can be drawn from this short discussion of the relations between the terms: (1) The term secularity depends on both of the other terms; (2) the term secularization depends on secularism; and (3) the term secularism might be used as a standalone concept, but in this case research would run the risk of becoming an academic end in itself. The term that lies at the very heart of the approach is clearly secularization: it relates secularity and secularism and thereby, though in different ways, gives meaning to both. It makes secularity secular, and it accounts for the effects of secularist actors’ actions. But since it refers to a process
in time, synchronous research based on the approach—the classic domain of empirical sociology—is at least problematic, since one cannot tell on a synchronous basis whether religious praxis adapted to secularism or vice versa. Thus, if the »secularization as struggle« approach is taken seriously, it calls for historical research by sociological means.

As a result of those three reasons that call for taking the approach on a diachronic level, the inability to supplement the approach with a historical perspective would mean that the »secularization as struggle« approach has failed. And the reader might indeed doubt whether it is possible to actually do the theoretical work necessary to incorporate a historical, truly diachronical perspective. After all, as was already mentioned, we are dealing with a theory of religious change based on Bourdieu, whose theory is often received as leaving little room for societal change (cf., most prominently, R. Jenkins 1992; for the reception in this regard see also Gorski 2013).

In contrast, I argue that there are at least three levels in Bourdieu in which change is possible (cf., in far more detail, Schlerka 2018). First, if the habitus concept is read in a dispositional way and related to concrete experiences (cf. Schäfer 2015a, 2018; forthcoming), the idea of constantly changing dispositions is much more plausible than the idea of a habitus fixed once and for all. Since Bourdieu clearly writes that the dispositions of the habitus are formed by experiences (cf. Bourdieu 1990, 53–60), in order to have a static conception of habitus one would have to specify a point in life when having experiences ends. Since such a point in life does not exist, I argue that habitus is in fact a dynamic concept (cf. Schlerka 2018, 6–8).

Second, the passing on of dispositions to younger generations and thus the reproduction of habitus in Bourdieu’s theory is more problematic than often alleged. Rather, what is often referred to as »inheritance« of dispositions is the result of educational labor that never leads to perfect reproduction. Rather, there are always certain degrees of freedom that allow for intergenerational change. The two most important ones derive from the experience-centered conceptualization of habitus as well. First, children never have the exact same experiences as their parents and
teachers, and second, they experience a whole world apart from their parents, mainly through friends. Both of these factors mean that despite educational labor, dispositions, let alone entire configurations of dispositions (read: habitus), can never be exactly reproduced. Even though the changes that happen in this way between different generations may be small, they exist and become more visible in long-term studies (cf. Schlerka 2018, 8–13).

Third, the potential for change is most obvious in the field concept with its strong focus on struggle. As I already mentioned, however, the field model itself cannot account for diachronic dynamics. Therefore, I propose modeling struggle as a series of events. In this conceptualization, an event is defined as anything that happens as long as an actor perceives it as an »invitation or threat« (Bourdieu 2010, 469) and reacts to it. The actor’s reaction again may be perceived and reacted to by other actors, and so on. The concept of the event is related to the social structure through the concept of capital. Actors are located in social structures, which in Bourdieu are commonly modeled by field and space. Both models depict the distribution of different capital sorts. Thus, occupying a position in social structure means having a limited stock of capital at one’s disposal. In order to act, and thus to (re-)act to an event, one must invest capital. This means that every (re-)action and thus every event in the series is endowed with a certain amount of capital. As a result, the series of events can also be read as a series of capital transfers, and thus as a series of changes in social structure (cf. Schlerka 2018, 13–19).

This way of reading Bourdieu can be made fruitful for »secularization as struggle.« While the change in dispositions, at least at first glance, seems to be of comparatively little interest for secularization, intergenerational change and especially the struggles are of great interest. Regarding the former, the empirical examples once more stem from Germany. First, there are Germany’s two largest mosque associations of Turkish origin: the above-mentioned DITIB and Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş (IGMG). Both Schiffauer (2010) for IGMG and Gorzewski (2015) for DITIB evidence that there was a change in the scope and structure of services offered as well as the aim of the organizations. Both relate those changes
to the emergence of the »second migrant generation,« born in Germany and not having experienced migration themselves. Their findings indicate that intergenerational change may bring about profound changes in the religious praxis of actors. Second, the excellent work on the conflict between state and churches in the GDR by Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux (2009) has to be mentioned. They conducted interviews with three different familial generations and found a considerable difference in religiosity between them, even if a certain »secularity« is passed on to the next generation (cf. Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux 2009, 137–66). Furthermore, especially their findings on the oldest generation, which had to adapt to the new conditions in the GDR, and the youngest, which had to do the same in united Germany after the end of the GDR indicate that dispositional change—or ageing—is more relevant for secularization than it first seemed.

All these examples point to two issues: events and struggle. To begin with, the two mosque associations changed in order to be more attractive for laity belonging to the »second migrant generation,« which is differentiated from the »first generation« by reference to an experienced event, namely migration. Also, the family generations in the study on the GDR differ according to events that they experienced: the establishment and fall of the GDR, and the conflict between the socialist state and the churches. This conflict could be modeled as a series of events. However, constructing such a model would require the collection and evaluation of a lot of additional data, for instance a detailed sequence of actions or data on the capital stock of the actors, and hence would easily go beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, the construction of a model of secularization as a series of events has to remain a desideratum for now.

Concluding remarks

In the first section of this paper I presented my approach of »secularization as struggle.« Based on Bourdieu’s praxeology, it provides a conflict-centered perspective on secularization processes that incorporates the aspects of several other approaches that view secularization from a conflict-centered perspective (Borutta 2010; Fox 2008, 2015; Karstein et al. 2006; Karstein
2013; Quack 2013; Smith 2003; Stolz 2013; Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux 2009). I provided consistent definitions of secularism, secularity, and secularization that, true to Bourdieu’s relational epistemology, derive their theoretical meaning from their interrelatedness. The central aspect of the approach is the struggle for the nomos of the religious field, that is, the principle of legitimate religious praxis. For this central aspect, I gave the examples of Reuter (2014), who focuses on legal conflicts about religion in Germany, and Borutta (2010), whose subject is the Kulturkämpfe in nineteenth-century Germany and Switzerland. Then, I argued that religious praxis—and thus also secularisms—can be assessed referring to the three modes of use of the term secularization given by Casanova (1994): differentiation, privatization, and religious decline. Next, I put forward that each of those three »dimensions of secularization« (Schlerka 2016) can be further differentiated, and I gave empirical examples of each of those aspects. This differentiation serves not only to cover a wide range of meanings of the term secularization, but also to provide a clearer view of complex phenomena such as government-controlled religion that is not used for political legitimation but refrains from making statements about anything other than affairs internal to the religious field. Without distinguishing between autonomy and expansivity and relying on a single term of differentiation, such a configuration could seem quite paradoxical.

In the second section I showed that »secularization as struggle« has to be supplemented with a historical perspective. I showed that there are three reasons to do this. First, in order to avoid historical generalizations and over-simplification; second, to take seriously the dynamics implied in a conflict-centered perspective; third and finally, as a result of the relational framework of terms in the approach. By discussing the relations between the terms, I showed that the heart of the concept is the term secularization, since it gives meaning to both of the other terms, namely secularity and secularism. As a consequence, the advantages of »secularization as struggle« come at the price of the necessity to combine sociological theory with historical research. Although there might be doubts whether the anchoring in Bourdieu’s praxeology allows for such an endeavor, I
argue that in fact the transformational aspect in Bourdieu’s theory is stronger than the reproductive, and that the latter is rather an empirical result than a theoretical property. Again, by reference to other scholars, I gave examples of change in dispositions, of intergenerational change, and finally I referred to the modeling of a series of events with a focus on secularization, albeit without being able to present such a model in this paper.

The approach to historicizing research on secularization from a conflict-centered perspective that I sketched here opens one’s view for further questions that bear some relevance for the analysis of secularization processes. There are three issues that in my opinion deserve particular attention. The first one is the question whether the eigenlawfulness of fields implies what one might call eigentemporalities. Even if the passages on this are scarce and quite obscure, Bourdieu himself provides some indications on this. One of these passages is in Rules of Art (Bourdieu 1995, 255–56), where he writes about different »life-cycles« that characterize fields. Following this indication, one might ask about the actors’ capability to quickly adapt to changes in their environment. For secularization it could prove quite significant if, for instance, scientific, mass media, or political actors were able to change and adapt more quickly than religious actors to changes in society overall. The second issue directly follows from the first and concerns the question for temporal strategies. This aspect is also mentioned in Bourdieu, especially in those passages that deal with gift exchange (e.g., Bourdieu 2000, 191–202). However, without a truly diachronic model, it is difficult to assess the scope and effect of such temporal strategies. In contrast, the model of the series of events might be of some help here. This issue could become meaningful for secularization, for example when it comes to strategies of delaying the proceedings in legal conflicts. Third and finally, generational conflicts are of interest. While in the approach on historicizing Bourdieu that I presented above the focus lies clearly on family generations and the passing on of dispositions through education, there may also be conflicts between different generations. To make things even more complex, there may be generations in a more Mannheimian sense, i.e., groups that conceive of themselves as
a generation, defined by the common experience of a certain historical macro-event, such as a war or a revolution. For secularization, again Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux (2009, 57–116) point to interesting issues. As I argued elsewhere (Schlerka 2018, 9), for the conceptualization of Mannheimian generations in a praxeological key the approach of Semi Purhonen (2016), whose concept of generations is similar to Bourdieu’s concept of classes, seems promising to me. According to Purhonen, generations first have to be mobilized by a spokesperson in order to exist as a group (2016, 106).

Also, it should be mentioned that research based on »secularization as struggle« might bring about some theoretical byproducts. Such research might shed light on two issues. The first was already mentioned above and concerns the role of the state. As several works discussed in this paper show (mainly Borutta 2010; Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux 2009; Karstein 2013; Reuter 2014; Fox 2015, 2008; but also Norris and Inglehart 2004; P. Jenkins 2002), the state plays a major role in secularization processes. Hence, research on these processes could illuminate further the issue of how to adequately grasp the state in a praxeological key. The second possible byproduct regards what one might call »relations between fields.« Since, when speaking about secularism, we are dealing with demands placed on religious praxis by actors that actually play different eigenlawful games, research on secularization inevitably deals with those phenomena.

All in all, I showed that »secularization as struggle« is indeed an approach of historical sociology.

13 However, speaking of relations between models might insinuate the false impression that fields are some kind of entity in social reality, while actually they are merely models constructed by the researcher.
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189


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